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9. Conclusions
KIM GEHEB LWECIA Ltd., LVFRP, P. 0. Box 2145, Jin/a, Uganda
9.1. Introduction
Although the issues discussed during the stakeholder workshops bear much similarity to the topics researched
during the 4-beaches survey, these two exercises were fundamentally different in one important way: in the case
of stakeholder workshops, the reactions of fishing communìty representatives to management questions was
markedly tempered by the presence of outside stakeholder groups at the same forum. The responses therefore
derived from those directly involved in the harvest and trade of fish should be understood to be either very
guarded, or designed to please other stakeholders, and assure them that fishing communities have no designs
over their power within the fishery.
The 4-beaches studies provide a different set of perspectives, demonstrating a willingness by fishing
communities to seize the opportunity to govern their fishing activities to varying degrees. Because these
exercises were carried out over the course of a year, it is probable that these data sets reflect a more accurate
view of what managerial functions communities are willing and able to accept than does the data from the
stakeholder workshops.
The stakeholder workshops, however, provide us with a crucial insight into the relationships between
stakeholders. Industrial fish processors tend to be well educated, well organised, very wealthy and often not of
East African origin. Certainly, where they deigned to attend, factory representatives demonstrated that they were
very used to announcing their positions and were rarely there to debate these. At the other extreme, groups of
female fish processors tended to be under-educated, often dìsorganised (although with important exceptions),
poor, over-worked, and weary of publicly debating managerial issues, At forums such as the stakeholder
workshops, the need to 'level the playing field' between stakeholder groups is an important consideration, and a
number of suggestions for how thìs may be done are included in the recommendations at the end of this
concluding chapter.
In the first two sections, I summarise what J consider to be the main lessons to be obtained from the 4-beaches
studies and then the stakeholder workshops. This section ends with a batch of recommendations for future work
and managerial strategies.
92. The 4-beaches surveys
By way of conclusions, it is worth making some general statements about these findings that may provide the
basis for future discussion on the management of Lake Victoria's fisheries:
It is clear that fishing communities are capable of organising themselves into groups that have specific
sets of objectives. In many cases, these objectives aim to support the members of the group, and not
necessarily fisheries management concerns.
Where byelaws have been created at landings, they appear mainly to aim at resolving conflicts, or
attempting to control trends and events that might cause conflict.
Occasionally, these byelaws will attempt to control certain fishing techniques that community members
believe are too effective to compete against. In effect, such techniques violate fishermen's senses of
fairness'.
On the lake, one the main areas of concern is theft, which might serve as a basis around which co-
management could be built.
The Tanzanian BMUs have little to show for them. Despite Ihale's BMU managing to settle its
conflict with the Village Government, it was uìiable to resolve accusations that it was a quisling
organisation that acted on behalf of the Fisheries Department against community interests. The BMU
at Ihale collapsed. At Mwasonge, the BMU initially worked directly to protect its own poisoning
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activities, but appears to have now moved away from these. It also claims to have been able to resolve its
differences with the Village Government.
How beach organisations are selected is a process of considerable importance. At Nkornbe, the selection
of the LMC was carried out by consensus. At Ihale, the manner in which the BMU had been selected was
cause for considerable, local, concern.
Sanctions at landing sites tend to be graduated and contextual. flow the offence is punished, and who
punishes it, will depend on the circumstances under which it was committed, who was involved and its
severity.
At both Mwasonge and Ihale, the 8MUs complained that they would seize offenders, and deliver them to
the DFO, only to see them later released.
Lack of funding for BMUs and/or the way in which available funds were divided was a repeatedly echoed
complaint. At Ihale, arguments over the collection and division of revenue lead to confrontation with
village government that was subsequently resolved.
9.3. The stakeholders' workshops
The questions posed to workshop participants yielded fairly guarded and conservative responses, possibly
because respondents were asked to write their thoughts out on posters, and worried that this formalised their
perspectives. Many of the management nieasures called for and discussed using this format seemed to represent
what participants had in the past been told represented important management issues, and the meeting used as an
opportunity to carefully display their knowledge of these.
As a result, much of what was presented was punctuated with jargon terminology - 'sustainability', 'bio-
diversity', 'co-management' etc. - without any real sense that participants knew what these implied. This vas
particularly the case when it came to the idea of 'co-management'. Although participants were willing to suggest
that management should be apportioned amongst various stakeholder groups, it was often the case that
stakeholders were understood to be participating in management by obeying the law (see also Wilson et al,,
1999). This dialogue continued despite widespi'ead claims that the fisheries departments were corrupt; and that
important regulatory tools - such as effort controls and TURFs - were discounted as legitimate tools for
regulation. The main thrust of the argument, therefore, was that if centralised government law was more harshly
and better enforced, the more successful management would be. It was not uncommon throughout the region that
calls were made for tougher and harsher punishments to be used to sanction offenders.
This theme was also reflected in the question concerning who should pay for management. While fishermen
agreed that they should contribute towards these costs, they felt that such outlays should be restricted to their
normal labour, capital and running costs. Similar sentiments were also echoed by fish processing factories, who
felt that they paid more than enough towards management through taxes and other royalties.
Discussion concerning rules and regulations also failed to yield new ideas or directions to explore. Where
offences lying outside the control of the law were mentioned, sanctioning of these was still largely considered
the responsibility of the state.
The stakeholders' workshops provided a glimpse of the still strong residue of colonial and protectorate
administration within the region. The discussion above clearly demonstrates the worries that fishing
communities have for challenging established power structures, even though they might feel that they are
capable of assuming managerial functions. It is clear that government still expects to retain 'the upper hand' ìn
fisheries management on Lake Victoria, and is prepared to hide behind the very weak and ambiguous debate that
surrounds managerial change in the region. By a similar token, other stakeholder groups remained weary, and
possibly even frightened, of seeking responsibilities under a co-managerial scheme, worried that indoing so they
might offend the powers that be and possibly attract their wrath.
It is difficult to conclude from the workshop proceedings that an effective dialogue on co-management was
obtained of particularly disappointment was the very half-hearted (possibly even reluctant) response of fish
processing factories to suggestions that they play a larger role in the conservation of Lake Victoria's
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fish stocks. That said, the discussions that occurred during these workshops was sufficiently animated and
vibrant to suggest that there is much to be gained from its extension.
9.4. Recommendations
Additional stakeholder workshops need to be held to further the discussion commenced during these
in itial workshops. In particular, it is necessary that the nettle o'f responsibility be grasped, and stakeholder
groups concretely identify their own roles, responsibilities and jurisdiction in the management of Lake
Victoria's resources.
Related to the latter recommendation is our belief that the grave problem of theft on the lake may be an
adequate basis for the development of community-level organisation, monitoring and punishment. Much
of the literature on Common Property Resource management insists that a commonly perceived dilemma
is the best - if not the only - way of ensuring community participation.
The right of communities to exercise management activities needs to be codified in law in such a way that
considerable latitude for their exercise is also catered for. it is only in this way that communities might
feel that they have nothìng to fear from assuming such responsibilities. Such rights should extend to both
the formulation of regulations and the sanctioning of offenders.
) The apparent inability of fishermen and crew to invest their earnings in activities beyond the lake, which
can sustain them both during short downturns in the catch, and/or longer-term stresses in the resource
base, must be viewed with concerti. Attention must be focussed on the development of strategies that
encourage investment in facilities for the maintenance and sustainability ofcommurìities in the long run.
e) Attention must be given to augmenting the role of fish processing factories iii the management of the lake.
At a bare minimum, factories must either voluntarily or be forced to introduce slot sizes for fish accepted,
and guarantees that nets purchased for their fishing fleets are of seven inches and above.
